What Makes States Go Nuclear?

National sovereignty and nuclear nonproliferation

Nuclear nonproliferation requires national sovereignty; states must believe that they can preserve their security without nuclear weapons. Where international law is respected, and powerful states can be constrained from attacking weaker ones, the incentives for nuclear proliferation decline. Where these conditions disappear, the logic of nuclear deterrence becomes increasingly compelling.

This is the dangerous lesson being taught by our current era.

The Trump regime’s attacks on Iran, its threats against Cuba, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, and numerous other examples have done immeasurable damage to the notion of nuclear nonproliferation. If you know there is a continuous danger of aggression from a great power, why not have a few A-bombs in your arsenal? North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear weapons, for example, makes grim strategic “sense” in a world where agreements mean nothing and there is no way of enforcing even the basics of international law.

As we enter an increasingly dangerous era, our movements must forge a common understanding of the relationship between nuclear nonproliferation and national self-determination. Only by defending both can we begin to rebuild an international order in which countries no longer believe that their survival depends upon possession of the bomb.

The Foundations of Nuclear Nonproliferation

The battle around the issue of nuclear nonproliferation began at nearly the moment that the first atomic bomb was tested in Los Alamos, New Mexico, in 1945, but certainly in the immediate aftermath of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nuclear weapons spread from the US to other countries, and were factored into military planning, though it took decades for much of the global military community to finally accept that the strategic use of nuclear weapons could not win a war.

The world coming to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962, with the Cuban Missile Crisis, alerted humanity to how quickly events could unfold and lead to global disaster.Various forms of nuclear nonproliferation agreements were developed after much of the scientific community united with mass anti-nuclear movements to change the popular narrative regarding the survivability of nuclear war—that is, to make clear that humanity would not survive it.. Splits within ruling circles also contributed towards these agreements.

Military establishments attempted to circumvent many of the restrictions on nuclear war through the sophistry of tactical nuclear weapons, i.e., lower-grade nuclear devices that could, allegedly, be utilized on the field of battle. Much of the world paid less attention to this threat as such discussions were sanitized.

An Unequal Nuclear Order

Nuclear nonproliferation, however, has never been an across-the-board set of equitable agreements. The US and, later, the USSR (followed by Russia), laid claims to the permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Over time, other countries joined the “club,” including Britain, France, China, India, and Pakistan. And then there were those that joined the “dark web” version of the nuclear community, such as Israel and their ally, apartheid South Africa , who would not acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons nor sign the nuclear non-proliferation agreement (at least, in the case of South Africa, until apartheid was defeated).

The early 1990s brought with it two interesting developments. The first was the newly independent Ukrainian government disinvesting from nuclear weapons and, literally, turning their weapons—as residue from the Cold War—over to the Russian Federation. The second development, on a very different note, was the escalating allegations that certain countries, particularly Iraq and North Korea, were either in possession of nuclear weapons or were on their way to possessing them.

Much of the discussion, at the time, revolved around nuclear nonproliferation and the threat from allegedly rogue states that might entertain using such weapons for strategic or tactical reasons. In the US media, fear was inflamed about the alleged danger of nuclear missiles being able to fly from Iraq and/or North Korea, potentially hitting US targets. Ironically, when probably the greatest danger of a nuclear exchange was between India and Pakistan—both of which admitted to possessing stockpiles of nuclear weapons—little global attention went towards the denuclearization of the Indian subcontinent and, instead, to a focus on alleged rogue actors.

Rather than any exploration as to whether and why Iraq, North Korea, and later Iran might have any interest in nuclear weapons, the focus in the global North—and particularly within the US—turned towards the alleged insanity and aggressiveness of the respective leaders of those countries and the supposed ease with which they might decide, willy-nilly, to push “the button” to ignite a nuclear conflagration.

The Incentives to Go Nuclear

The 2003 war against Iraq, the current war against Iran, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, along with the threat of war against Cuba, should render a more sober discussion on the motivations of smaller nations when it comes to nuclear weapons.

Not only was the US wrong in falsely arguing the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003, but they created a dilemma, particularly for smaller nations, which we have been living with ever since. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had been a strange ally of the USA. Within a matter of weeks after Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the US and Iraq became enemies. Iraq suddenly became the target of US allegations regarding nuclear ambitions. As we all know, a war then ensued. Was the lesson that the Iraqis should have developed nuclear weaponry? Was the lesson that friendship between nations, even friendship between toxic administrations, was irrelevant?

When Ukraine became independent of the USSR in 1991, Russia recognized Ukraine’s borders. In 1994, in exchange for an agreement that Russia would never invade or threaten Ukraine, the Ukrainians turned over their nuclear arsenal. In 2022, Putin’s Russia carried out a massive invasion of Ukraine. Was the lesson that Ukraine should never have turned over its nuclear weapons?

In 1962, the USSR provided Cuba with nuclear missiles for the purpose of self-defense against US aggression. The world came very close to war. The Soviets withdrew their missiles in exchange for the US withdrawing missiles from Turkey and an understanding of no military attack on Cuba. In 2026, in clear violation of international law, the Trump administration began strangling the Cuban people and threatening an armed invasion. Is the lesson that Cuba should have developed weapons of mass destruction?

The history of the Democratic People’s Republic of (North) Korea offers an alternative example. Regardless of how one views the government of the DPRK, their possession of nuclear weapons has been a real factor in how countries around the world weigh whether it’s wise to attempt regime change. Given the extent to which the DPRK fears an armed and possibly nuclear assault by the US and the Republic of (South) Korea, their development of nuclear weapons is quite understandable, even if one disagrees on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. After all, as the saying goes, just because one is paranoid does not mean someone isn’t out to get them.

Particularly in the post-Cold War period, the guard rails on both nuclear proliferation and national aggression are unraveling. Where no international accountability exists to protect nations under armed threat, taking the direction of weapons of mass destruction becomes completely logical, if at the same time horrific. One need only look at the US/Israeli war against Iran following Trump’s destruction of the Obama administration-led international treaty with Iran regarding nuclear weapons and power, combined with the Israeli intent to keep western Asia in complete turmoil. Topping this, during negotiations between Iran and the US, Trump decided, twice, to initiate armed conflict. Is the lesson that Iran needed nuclear weapons?

Toward a Stronger Movement for Peace and Justice

To a great extent, at least in the US, there has been a strange space or wall between movements and efforts against nuclear proliferation, movements against war, and movements to defend the national sovereignty of peoples and states under threat by imperialists or national bullies. These movements occasionally overlap but they do not seem to include the same people. The reality of the current world situation is that there is an actual and practical overlap in the issues and, therefore, there must be an overlap in response.

Thus, at a critical movement such as this, opposition to nuclear weapons and the need for nuclear free zones—as is desperately needed in western Asia and on the Indian subcontinent—must be linked to larger matters of national sovereignty and the right of nations to settle internal matters in the absence of foreign interference. We certainly should have learned this lesson in 2003 in the context of the Iraq War, but many of us looked at it too narrowly and focused on the arrogance and aggression of the US alone, not recognizing the longer-term implications of the invasion. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the US/Israeli attack on Iran, the stakes have heightened and the desire for a nuclear counter-threat to aggression appears to become more reasonable for those facing assault.

Bill Fletcher, Jr. is a longtime socialist, trade unionist, international solidarity activist, and writer of fiction and nonfiction. @BillFletcherJr; billfletcherjr.com