The overthrow of the brutal Assad regime is to be celebrated for sure, but it is hardly a victory for the Syrian people, at least not yet. As we speak, Syria is being carved up by Israel, Turkey, and the USA, while HTS holds power in Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus. The diverse Syrian people have yet to coalesce in a governing coalition - HTS is not that - and whether they will be able to do so and overcome the internal divisions and outside intervention is an open question. This may not be a CIA coup, but US sanctions and military occupation of Syrian oil fields and important agricultural land were instrumental in the destruction of the Assad regime; and the role of the Turks in protecting and arming the rebel army in Idlib was also a big factor in setting the stage for the HTS assault on the urban centers. Now Syrian military assets are being systematically destroyed by Israeli bombs, strategic territory on the approach to Damascus seized and occupied by Israel, and it is not clear that the Israeli advance will stop there. What we see here is not a victorious popular revolution, but an intervention by global and regional powers and their proxies. We can hope the Syrian people find their way to unite and defeat their enemies, and we should support those efforts; but that seems unlikely in the short run.
Recent events in Syria remind me of the old saying, "The enemy of my enemy is not my friend," a sentiment that aptly captures the complexities of Turkey’s role as a major regional actor facing both external and internal challenges. With a large industrial base and a strategic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Turkey wields significant influence. Its military, the second-largest in NATO, is well-trained and well-equipped. Nevertheless, the Turkish leadership views the PKK and YPG as existential threats while contending with severe income polarization and inflation, legacies of decades of neoliberal reforms. These internal struggles shape Turkey's external ambitions, complicating its relationships with other regional actors as well as the USA.
One such ambition is the potential for irredentist annexation of parts of Syria and Iraq, regions that were once integral to the Ottoman Empire. For the Turkish leadership, reclaiming these territories might be seen by some as a way to "correct an error of history," addressing both historical grievances and domestic pressures. However, such moves directly conflict with American plans for West Asia, raising critical questions: Will the United States abandon its Kurdish allies to appease Turkey, or will it shift its stance and turn Erdogan into the next leader targeted for regime change? Either choice risks significant geopolitical repercussions.
These geopolitical shifts in West Asia not only reshape regional power dynamics but also amplify tensions in Europe, as migration and security concerns intersect with rising nationalist sentiments. Rising anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric, fueled by economic instability in the EU, is reshaping Europe’s political landscape. For instance, the AfD seems poised to gain significant ground in the upcoming German snap elections, reflecting broader dissatisfaction among European populations. As EU governments struggle to maintain stability, the consequences of shifting alliances in West Asia are likely to reverberate eastward, influencing trade, security, and political alignments across Asia.
The overthrow of the brutal Assad regime is to be celebrated for sure, but it is hardly a victory for the Syrian people, at least not yet. As we speak, Syria is being carved up by Israel, Turkey, and the USA, while HTS holds power in Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus. The diverse Syrian people have yet to coalesce in a governing coalition - HTS is not that - and whether they will be able to do so and overcome the internal divisions and outside intervention is an open question. This may not be a CIA coup, but US sanctions and military occupation of Syrian oil fields and important agricultural land were instrumental in the destruction of the Assad regime; and the role of the Turks in protecting and arming the rebel army in Idlib was also a big factor in setting the stage for the HTS assault on the urban centers. Now Syrian military assets are being systematically destroyed by Israeli bombs, strategic territory on the approach to Damascus seized and occupied by Israel, and it is not clear that the Israeli advance will stop there. What we see here is not a victorious popular revolution, but an intervention by global and regional powers and their proxies. We can hope the Syrian people find their way to unite and defeat their enemies, and we should support those efforts; but that seems unlikely in the short run.
Recent events in Syria remind me of the old saying, "The enemy of my enemy is not my friend," a sentiment that aptly captures the complexities of Turkey’s role as a major regional actor facing both external and internal challenges. With a large industrial base and a strategic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Turkey wields significant influence. Its military, the second-largest in NATO, is well-trained and well-equipped. Nevertheless, the Turkish leadership views the PKK and YPG as existential threats while contending with severe income polarization and inflation, legacies of decades of neoliberal reforms. These internal struggles shape Turkey's external ambitions, complicating its relationships with other regional actors as well as the USA.
One such ambition is the potential for irredentist annexation of parts of Syria and Iraq, regions that were once integral to the Ottoman Empire. For the Turkish leadership, reclaiming these territories might be seen by some as a way to "correct an error of history," addressing both historical grievances and domestic pressures. However, such moves directly conflict with American plans for West Asia, raising critical questions: Will the United States abandon its Kurdish allies to appease Turkey, or will it shift its stance and turn Erdogan into the next leader targeted for regime change? Either choice risks significant geopolitical repercussions.
These geopolitical shifts in West Asia not only reshape regional power dynamics but also amplify tensions in Europe, as migration and security concerns intersect with rising nationalist sentiments. Rising anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric, fueled by economic instability in the EU, is reshaping Europe’s political landscape. For instance, the AfD seems poised to gain significant ground in the upcoming German snap elections, reflecting broader dissatisfaction among European populations. As EU governments struggle to maintain stability, the consequences of shifting alliances in West Asia are likely to reverberate eastward, influencing trade, security, and political alignments across Asia.